The things you list there are NATO gaps, based on NATO’s, or more correctly the US’ ambition to project power and play world police.
Why do we need heavy air transport capabilties when we have rail lines? How is Ukraine right now handling destruction of Russian air defense (not even speaking about their actual performance vs what they should be able to do on paper) with just a fraction of the EU’s SEAD/DEAD capabilties? How are they even operating without the US sharing data for more than a year? Might Europeans actually be able to gather information about a neighbour on the same land mass effectively with less ressources? And why is the ability for nuclear annihilation not enough, but the ability to destroy the planet another 50 times after that is somehow a gap?
Yeah, we know. NATO is weaker without the US, but that’s true for any member. Just because some clown in the White House is too stupid to realize this and plans artic warfare after alienating basically 95% of NATO’s artic capabilities or getting a strait blokced by mines while insulting allies with the actual demining capabilities, we don’t need to make the same stupid mistake. The US capabilities mostly align with US requirements. Ones that are no longer NATO requirements when the US decides to not be a part anymore.
Overall I am agreeing with your comment but I am wondering about
How are they even operating without the US sharing data for more than a year?
Is that still ongoing? Who is providing intelligence then? It didn’t sound like France:
A French defence ministry official also declined to comment directly on the president’s claims, but said much of the intelligence France provides is technical in nature.
First, most of the EU’s frontier has non-European gauge track. So, it doesn’t help to be able to rely on rail when you have to stop rail shipments well behind the front lines. Upgrading the rail is going to be a generational project.
Second, rail infrastructure can be destroyed and it is generally harder to get rail infrastructure back up after being bombed. Not being able to deploy forces while you wait for repairs.
most of the EU’s frontier has non-European gauge track
Adapting to Western track gauge (thus also not running on the standard Russia uses for their logistics would indeed be a worthwhile investment in a countries defense, doubling also as a investment into civilian transport capabilities.
Second, rail infrastructure can be destroyed and it is generally harder to get rail infrastructure back up after being bombed
Reality disagrees, heavily so as Russia is demonstrating for years now. And you’re probably underestimating the complexity of keeping runways of a quality, width and length to support heavy transports operational. Anti-runway bombs and missiles are a whole class of weapons developed just for that reason.
PS: Speaking of… is this not accurate?
Sorry to tell you, but given the existence of Kaliningrad and Belarus the actual front line will not be far from Poland. (And Scandinavia and Finland are mostly irrelevant for this discussion as neither flight nor rail will be the primary mode of transportation to get there.)
Regarding adapting non-Western gauge track, it is worth making the transition. The item that I addressed and you dodged is timeline.
Regarding Russia rebuilding its rail infrastructure, Russia has invested a significant amount of money in military engineering brigades to repair rail corridors. Also, Russia isn’t fighting off an invading force.
You’re still leaving out Finland and the Baltics. It also depends on what Russia may attempt to take back. Putin’s current goals appears to be reestablishing control over Soviet territory. That puts the Baltics at risk. You could see Russia attempt to take the Baltics similar to how it took the Crimean Peninsula and make the EU choose if it is worth it to conduct a war to liberate the Baltics like Ukraine had to debate liberate the Crimean Peninsula.
I explicitly mentioned Finland (transport by ship instead of rail or air) and implicitly addressed the Baltics as any attack on them will start with an attempt to close the Suwalki gap between Kalinigrad and Belarus, which makes Eastern Poland the front line.
and you dodged is timeline
Some rail lines in the Baltics were already reworked, some were build new, years ago with a new track guage not matching the former Russian one but intentionally not to EU standard. So I’m not addressing the timeline because there was obviously no interest in the first place.
You know. I’ve literally told you only yesterday. What are you doing here?
The things you list there are NATO gaps, based on NATO’s, or more correctly the US’ ambition to project power and play world police.
Why do we need heavy air transport capabilties when we have rail lines? How is Ukraine right now handling destruction of Russian air defense (not even speaking about their actual performance vs what they should be able to do on paper) with just a fraction of the EU’s SEAD/DEAD capabilties? How are they even operating without the US sharing data for more than a year? Might Europeans actually be able to gather information about a neighbour on the same land mass effectively with less ressources? And why is the ability for nuclear annihilation not enough, but the ability to destroy the planet another 50 times after that is somehow a gap?
Yeah, we know. NATO is weaker without the US, but that’s true for any member. Just because some clown in the White House is too stupid to realize this and plans artic warfare after alienating basically 95% of NATO’s artic capabilities or getting a strait blokced by mines while insulting allies with the actual demining capabilities, we don’t need to make the same stupid mistake. The US capabilities mostly align with US requirements. Ones that are no longer NATO requirements when the US decides to not be a part anymore.
Overall I am agreeing with your comment but I am wondering about
Is that still ongoing? Who is providing intelligence then? It didn’t sound like France:
https://feddit.org/post/30634928
Could it be that it is explicitly vague since Ukraine is hitting deep inside Russia and Russia shouldn’t judge it as a western attack?
You need heavy air capabilities for two reasons.
First, most of the EU’s frontier has non-European gauge track. So, it doesn’t help to be able to rely on rail when you have to stop rail shipments well behind the front lines. Upgrading the rail is going to be a generational project.
Second, rail infrastructure can be destroyed and it is generally harder to get rail infrastructure back up after being bombed. Not being able to deploy forces while you wait for repairs.
Adapting to Western track gauge (thus also not running on the standard Russia uses for their logistics would indeed be a worthwhile investment in a countries defense, doubling also as a investment into civilian transport capabilities.
Reality disagrees, heavily so as Russia is demonstrating for years now. And you’re probably underestimating the complexity of keeping runways of a quality, width and length to support heavy transports operational. Anti-runway bombs and missiles are a whole class of weapons developed just for that reason.
PS: Speaking of… is this not accurate?
Sorry to tell you, but given the existence of Kaliningrad and Belarus the actual front line will not be far from Poland. (And Scandinavia and Finland are mostly irrelevant for this discussion as neither flight nor rail will be the primary mode of transportation to get there.)
Regarding adapting non-Western gauge track, it is worth making the transition. The item that I addressed and you dodged is timeline.
Regarding Russia rebuilding its rail infrastructure, Russia has invested a significant amount of money in military engineering brigades to repair rail corridors. Also, Russia isn’t fighting off an invading force.
You’re still leaving out Finland and the Baltics. It also depends on what Russia may attempt to take back. Putin’s current goals appears to be reestablishing control over Soviet territory. That puts the Baltics at risk. You could see Russia attempt to take the Baltics similar to how it took the Crimean Peninsula and make the EU choose if it is worth it to conduct a war to liberate the Baltics like Ukraine had to debate liberate the Crimean Peninsula.
I explicitly mentioned Finland (transport by ship instead of rail or air) and implicitly addressed the Baltics as any attack on them will start with an attempt to close the Suwalki gap between Kalinigrad and Belarus, which makes Eastern Poland the front line.
Some rail lines in the Baltics were already reworked, some were build new, years ago with a new track guage not matching the former Russian one but intentionally not to EU standard. So I’m not addressing the timeline because there was obviously no interest in the first place.
Asking for other opinions.
Looking for engagement.